Liquidity and payday loans traders
Sunshine trading We assume that information on the identity of some uninformed traders is made public or is known by the other market participants, and that their trading strategies are being pre-announced, which means that the size of the orders they will submit at a certain time in the near future is disclosed. The idea behind this practice is that by pre-announcing, uninformed traders should have lower adverse selection costs; essentially, market-makers should reduce the costs for the orders that they recognize as uninformed. Admati and Pfleiderer (1991) call the pre-announcement of uninformed traders’ orders ‘sunshine trading’. They study the effects of pre-announcement, assuming a market similar to the competitive protocol of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). Here, however, we analyse the efficacy of sunshine trading in the Kyle-type framework in which agents behave strategically; the Grossman–Stiglitz framework is left for the discussion of anonymity in section 10.1.2. The model used here differs from Kyle’s standard model discussed in section 3.3.2 in that it has two types of liquidity trader: those who pre-announce orders and those who do not. By pre-announcing, liquidity traders disclose themselves as uninformed before trading starts; those who do not pre-announce do not reveal their type. The purpose of the model is to determine the effects of pre-announcement on market quality and traders’ welfare. Which traders will take the other side of uninformed traders’ pre-announced orders is also in question.